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SUBJECT

The Soviet Anti-Polaris Program

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REQUESTED BY

: DDI-

PURPOSE

: (expansion of Mil Div Highlights of last week)

DESIRED LENGTH :

SPECIAL DISSEM

: Category B routine internal and external.

GRAPHICS

ILLEGIB

COORDINATION

OUTSIDE OCI

ASSIGNED TO

: Mil Div/OCI

DUE DATE:

OAD REVIEW

1. O/DCI

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6. WA

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2. O/DDI

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## INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

### THE SOVIET ANTI-POLARIS PROGRAM

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE  
Office of Current Intelligence

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Office of Current Intelligence  
11 January 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Soviet Anti-Polaris Program

1. The Soviets have shown that they fully appreciate the offensive capabilities of the US Polaris strike system. They are actively attempting to develop measures to blunt the effectiveness of this system. Their counter-Polaris program involves both political-propaganda moves and technical and tactical countermeasures. The latter are primarily in the research and development stage but the former are in full bloom.

2. Soviet propaganda media are charged with convincing the world that the Soviet Navy has a capability for destroying Polaris submarines. In addition, the propaganda line stresses that US Polaris bases will draw Soviet nuclear strikes on host countries in event of war and that the Polaris system is a sinister threat to peace and to disarmament. This propaganda, along with diplomatic and political activity, has the goal of closing some operating areas and foreign ports to Polaris submarines. For example, efforts were made to deny the Mediterranean Sea as a Polaris patrol area, particularly during 1962-1963, and currently there is an effort to deny the Indian Ocean as an operational area by stirring up protests among nations bordering it.

3. In the field of technical and tactical countermeasures, the Soviets have a broad program designed to improve their presently marginal anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. An extensive oceanographic effort has been directed toward gathering environmental information in strategic areas and underwater sound research, in particular, has been emphasized.

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5. The prospects are that the Soviets will continue and even broaden all of these efforts. We may soon see such developments as an attempt to "tail" a US Polaris unit by a Soviet nuclear submarine; expanded at-sea ASW training, particularly in the Norwegian Sea; and perhaps the appearance of a new class of attack submarine with improved ASW characteristics. The Soviets probably realize that for at least the next several years their capabilities for dealing effectively with the Polaris threat will be negligible. This is particularly true since the advent of the longer range A-3 Polaris missile which has greatly expanded the ocean area in which the strike submarines can operate and, consequently, has considerably complicated the Soviet defensive problems. Moscow may believe, however, that it can create an impression that it cope with the Polaris which, in a cold war, may be nearly as useful. Additionally it may hope for some technological breakthrough in antisubmarine warfare which, coupled with the development of some anti-ballistic missile capability, would permit it to reduce this strategic US threat to acceptable proportions.

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